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JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1
Clarifying the Preemptive Scope of CERCLA Section 9658
Waldburger v. CTS Corp1
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to rising public concern regarding the dumping of hazardous
wastes, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which was designed to
remedy unlawful disposal and transportation of hazardous wastes as well as
inadequate maintenance of disposal sites.2 Because some state statutes of
limitation severely restricted parties from bringing CERCLA claims as they
commenced “at the time of the injury instead of when the party ‘discovered’
that a hazardous substance caused the injury,” Congress enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).3 SARA
established a discovery rule outlined in Section 9658,4 which was a federally
required commencement date that “preempts state statutes of limitation if the
claims are based on hazardous substance releases and the state limitations
period provides a commencement date earlier than federal law.”5
When Congress passed Section 9658 of CERCLA on October 17,
1986,6 the plaintiff’s bar prematurely lauded the section as a device that
would eliminate procedural barriers that prevented certain causes of action
from being brought due to restrictive state-imposed statutes of limitation and

1

Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2013).
Karen S. Nabholz, The Tick of the Statute of Limitations Clock: How the FRCD
Preempts the State Law Accrual Date in Freier v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 15
VILL. ENVTL.L.J. 41 (2004).
3
Id. at 42.
4
See infra note 53 (clarifying Section 9658 as also being the codified section and
Section 309 as being the actual section of CERCLA).
5
Nabholz, supra note 2 (citing Angeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer & Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
594, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(explaining circumstances where FRCD preempts state statutes
of limitation)(quoting Tower Ashphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding & Tank Serv., 530 N.W.2d
872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))).
6
P.L. No. 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1695-96 (Oct. 17, 1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
9658).
2
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statutes of repose.7 However, since Section 9658’s inception, there have
been varying interpretations of the implications of the preemptive language
found in the section,8 stirring much debate among federal courts.9 Center in
this debate is whether Congress intended for CERCLA to preempt not only
statutes of limitation, which focus on when the injury occurred or was
discovered by the plaintiff, but also statutes of repose, which focus on when
the defendant’s tortious act occurred.10 History suggests Congress used the
terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” interchangeably. 11
The following comment explores Waldburger v. CTS Corp.,12 in
which the Fourth Circuit was faced with the question of whether Section
9658 preempted a North Carolina statute of repose, despite the language of
Section 9658 referring only to “statutes of limitations.” The main issue to be
analyzed is whether the Fourth Circuit’s application of the preemptive
language of Section 9658 as applied to state statutes of repose adequately
reflects Congress’s intent in passing the section. By correctly holding in
Waldburger that Congress’s intent was to preempt both statutes of limitation
and statutes of repose, the Fourth Circuit has further clarified how federal
courts should apply the preemptive language of Section 9658 to statutes of
repose.
II. FACTS & HOLDINGS
Appellants David Bradley, Renee Richardson and twenty-three other
landowners (“the landowners”) brought a nuisance action against Appellee
CTS Corporation (“CTS”), after discovering in 2009 their well water
contained concentrated levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) and cis-1, 2dichlorothene (DCE)—both known carcinogens.13

7

Van R. Delhotal, Re-Examining CERCLA Section 309: Federal Preemption of State
Limitations Periods, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 415 (1995).
8
Id.
9
See infra note 144.
10
See infra notes 93 and 94.
11
See infra note 84.
12
723 F.3d 434.
13
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 2013).
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From 1959 to 1985, CTS manufactured and disposed of electronics
and electronic parts at the Mills Gap Road Electroplating Facility (“Facility”)
on a fifty-four-acre plant located in Asheville, North Carolina.14 In its
operation at the Facility, CTS stored significant amounts of TCE.15
Additionally, manufacturing of the electronic products required the usage of
TCE, cyanide, chromium VI, and lead.16 Upon selling the Facility in 1987,
CTS promised realtors the site was environmentally sound and no wanton
disposal practices occurred at the Facility.17 Further, CTS assured realtors
that once any existing storage drums of hazardous materials were removed
from the premises, any threat to human health or the environment would
cease.18
Over the years, the landowners bought portions of the land where the
Facility was formerly located.19 However, subsequent to the purchase, the
landowners were notified by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
that their property was contaminated.20 Jointly, residents who lived within
the area of the former Facility brought a state law nuisance claim and
contended they were continuously being exposed to toxins from the air, land
and water resulting from CTS’s operations.21 Due to their allegations of
unknowingly being exposed to toxins, the landowners cited damages such as
diminution in the value of their land and fear for their health and safety.22
Further, the landowners requested a judgment forcing CTS to reclaim
1,000,000 pounds of toxic contaminants belonging to the corporation;
remediation of the harm caused by CTS; and monetary compensation for
losses and damages suffered, both present and future.23

14

Id. Waldburger, 723 F.3d. at 440.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 440.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
15
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In response to the complaint, CTS filed a motion to dismiss, citing a
North Carolina statute24 that sets a ten-year limitations period for a real
property action that accrues over time.25 The statute establishes that
claimants cannot bring an action for property damage more than ten years
after the defendant’s tortious act.26 Importantly, the statute makes knowledge
of the harm within the ten-year window irrelevant.27 Accordingly, CTS
argued that because their alleged last act or omission occurred in 1987 and
the landowners were bringing the nuisance action in 2011, the claim should
be barred based on North Carolina’s law.28
In return, the landowners relied on the language of CERCLA to prove
that their claim should not be barred.29 Specifically, the landowners argued
CERCLA’s Section 9658 discovery rule, under which claims accrue on the
date plaintiffs knew or should have known of injuries as a result of hazardous
substances, preempted North Carolina law.30 However, the magistrate judge
rejected the landowners’ argument and differentiated the North Carolina law
as a statute of repose, whereas Section 9658 of CERCLA only preempts state
statutes of limitation.31 Based on the magistrate judge’s recommendation of
dismissal, the district court granted CTS’s motion to dismiss.32
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the characterization of North Carolina’s law as a

24

“Within three years an action…[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, for personal
injury or physical damage to claimant’s property, the cause of action, except in causes of
actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c), shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or
physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become
apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs. Provided that no cause of action shall
accrue more than 10 years form the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the
cause of action.” N.C. GEN.STAT. § 1-52(16).N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-52(16).
25
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441.
26
Id. at 440-41.
27
Id. at 441.
28
Id.Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441.
29
Id. at 438.
30
Id. at 441.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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statute of repose and instead likened it to a statute of limitation.33 Because
the court found no distinction between the North Carolina law and Section
9658, the court held that CERCLA preempted North Carolina’s ten-year
limitation on the accrual of real property claims.34 Accordingly, statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose conflicting with Section 9658 of CERCLA
will be preempted.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of CERCLA
In response to the Valley of the Drums35 and Love Canal36 disasters in
the 1960s and 1970s, Congress was faced with the task of developing
legislation that would establish a means of redress and compensation for the
dumping of toxic wastes. Thus, in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA to
address the emerging problem of unregulated hazardous substance release.37
CERCLA identifies both a public and private mechanism for determining
liability with regards to clean up and compensation.38 CERCLA allows for
33

Id. at 442-443.
Id. at 445.Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 445.
35
“The Valley of the Drums is a twenty-three acre site near Louisville, Kentucky, where
a large number of waste-storing drums were deposited in the 1960s. The drums’ leakage and
the lack of regulation at the site caused an environmental disaster.” Id. at 438 n.1 (citing NPL
Site Narrative for A.L. Taylor (Valley of the Drums), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 8, 1983),
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar447.htm).Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d
434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing NPL Site Narrative for A.L. Taylor (Valley of the Drums),
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 8, 1983), http:// www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar447.htm).
36
Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, New York, became a dumpsite in the 1920s for toxic
chemicals and the consequences of the contamination did not come to light until the 1970s. .
Id. at 438 n.2 (citing Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Jan. 1979), http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy).Waldburger v. CTS Corp.,
723 F.3d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013)(citing Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, Envtl.
Prot. Agency (Jan.1979), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html.
37
Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS.
LAW. 923, 925 (1990). Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 45 Bus. Law. 923, 925 (1990).
38
Id.
34
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the federal government to immediately be given the “tools necessary for a
prompt and effective response to problems” derived from the dumping of
toxic materials39 and impose cleanup costs on those responsible for the
unlawful dumping.40
Additionally, CERCLA was designed to “establish a comprehensive
response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites” and
“shift the costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination.”41
Notably, because Congress passed CERCLA during the closing hours of the
ninety-sixth session and did so only due to a compromise that blended three
separate bills, the Act has been notorious for its lack of clarity.42 However, it
is clear that CERCLA is a remedial statute designed to right the wrongs
caused by the illegal dumping of toxic wastes.43
Because of the haphazard manner in which CERCLA was passed,
Congress created a Study Group (“Group”) to “determine the adequacy of
common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to
man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances in
the environment.”44 By creating the Group, Congress decided against
creating a “federal cause of action for persons injured by the release of
39

United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn.1982).United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn.1982).
40
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
109 S.Ct. 2273, 2277 (1989).
41
Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., 473 F.3d
824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am.
Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting H.R.Rep. No.
96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).
42
“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently
for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage.”
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 438 (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
Cnty., 851 F.2d 643, 658 (3rd Cir. 1988)).
43
Id. (citing Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 473 F.3d at 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007)
(internal citations omitted)).
44
42 U.S.C.. § 9651 (2012).
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hazardous substances.”45 Instead, the twelve-member Group, comprised of
law professors and attorneys from both the plaintiff and defense bars,
considered the adequacy of current state common law remedies for
compensating victims of hazardous wastes.46 The Group considered the
sufficiency and availability of existing remedies under the then present state
statutes in remedying harm from the unlawful dumping of hazardous
substances; the nature of barriers to recovery with respect to initiating
lawsuits; the scope of evidentiary burdens placed on the plaintiff, especially
in consideration of the hurdle of scientific uncertainty in proving causation;
the adequacy of existing remedies available for compensation for natural
resources damage; the scope of liability—especially with respect to
insurance—that limits initial liability; and barriers to recovery due to existing
laws establishing statutes of limitation.47
Among their findings, the Group noted that environmental injuries
related to the dumping of hazardous substances generally have “long latency
periods, sometimes [twenty] years or longer[,]” and state laws ordering
causes of action to accrue upon the defendant’s last act or plaintiff’s exposure
to harm will defeat a lawsuit before its initiation since manifestations of
injury will often occur after the statute of limitations has fully run.48 Thus, as
a result of the findings, the Group recommended “that all states . . . clearly
adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the injury or disease and its cause.”49 The Group came to
this conclusion in order to “remove unreasonable procedural and other
barriers to recovery in court” for plaintiffs, including rules associated with
the “time of accrual of actions.”50 Notably, the Group made a point to apply
45

Delhotal, supra note 7, at 420.
Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure
Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 51
(2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)).
47
42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1)-(4).
48
Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, Injuries and Damages from Hazardous
Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, A Report to Congress in Compliance
with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (Comm. Print 1982) available at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004856327;view=1up;seq=45.
49
Id. at 241.
50
Id. at 240.
46
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their findings to cover the repeal of state statutes of repose, such as the North
Carolina law at issue in Waldburger v. CTS Corp.51
B. Section 9658 of CERCLA
In response to the Group’s findings, Congress opted out of waiting for
the individual states to amend their statutes and instead chose to “address the
problem identified in the study.”52 Thus, on October 17, 1986, Section
965853 was added to CERCLA.54 The key provision of Section 9658 states:
“If the applicable limitations period55 for specified state law actions provides
a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required
commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required
commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.”56
Specifically, the “federally required commencement date” is, “the date
plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or
property damages … were caused or contributed to by the hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”57 Section 9658 is
applicable to “[a]ny action brought under state law for personal injury, or
property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any
hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the
environment from a facility....”58

51

Id. at 241.
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 439 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354).
53
§ 9658 refers to the statutory section number, but the reader should keep in mind that
the section can also be referred to by its CERCLA section number (§ 309). Technically, §
309 was added to CERCLA and then codified as § 9658, but for the sake of consistency and
our purposes, I will use § 9658 throughout this note.
54
Delhotal, supra note 7, at 417 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 203(a), 100 Stat. 1695096
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9658)).
55
“The term ‘applicable limitations period’ is defined to mean the period specified in a
statute of limitations during which the specified civil actions may be brought . . . It includes
both statutory and common law commencement dates.” Id. at 417 n.8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
9658(b)(2), (a)(1) (2012)).
56
42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1).
57
42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A).
58
42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1).
52
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Essentially, Section 9658 sets a federal minimum standard for accrual
dates in certain type of cases, such as those involving personal injury and
property damage claims.59 Such federal minimum standards are not novel—
federal law has established many minimum standards in environmental
legislation, such as the Clean Air Act and Solid Waste Disposal Act. 60
However, Section 9658 has been the subject of criticism for seemingly
violating the principles of federalism by encroaching on the sovereign
authority of a state in determining statutes of limitation for certain causes of
actions.61 Nonetheless, Section 9658 is significant in that if either a state
statutory or common law provides for an earlier accrual date than that of
Section 9658, the federal minimum date usurps the state law.62 Alternatively,
Section 9658 allows for the application of state law if the accrual date would
be the same under federal law.63
C. Interpreting Ambiguous Statutes
Courts are frequently faced with interpreting statutes whose meanings
are not easily discernible. When faced with interpreting such a statute, the
court’s goal is to “effectuate Congress’s intent”64 by reading the text of the
statute65 and considering whether the law is either plain in meaning or
ambiguous. If a plain reading of the text is appropriate, the court will accord
it the straightforward meaning, “absent … clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary.”66 However, if the text is determined to be ambiguous, the
court will defer to the legislative history of the statute.67 A statute is deemed
ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,” but
59

Delhotal, supra note 7, at 418.
Id. at 418 n.22 (internal citations omitted).
61
Id. (citing Alfred R. Light, Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New
Superfund Act, 38 MERCER L. REV. 643, 651 (1987)).
62
42 U.S.C. 9658(a)(1).
63
Id.
64
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 442 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010)).
65
Id. (citing Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1999)).
66
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442 (citing Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 607 (quoting United
States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1993))).
67
Id. (quoting Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc)).
60
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is not considered ambiguous if different interpretations are merely
conceivable.68 Additionally, the court considers the specific context in which
the language is used—specifically giving consideration to the broader context
of the statute as a whole.69
D. The Preemption Doctrine
As a principle of statutory interpretation, the notion of “presumption
against preemption” is relatively new when considering early discussions of
state versus federal power.70 Deriving from the Supremacy Clause,71 the
preemption doctrine is the “judicial tool by which courts define the contours
of federal control of a subject when Congress has legislated pursuant to one
of its enumerated powers.”72 Further, the doctrine “gives content to the
parameters of that principle in areas left in doubt under particular federal
legislation, and there inevitably will be areas of doubt.”73 Ultimately, the
preemption doctrine attempts to define what law controls when there is a
conflict, or the appearance of one, between federal and state law.74
Historically, when Congress decided to enter an area of regulation,
there was an assumption that Congress occupied the entire field being
regulated.75 However, with the advent of the New Deal in the 1930s, the
Supreme Court increasingly became uncomfortable with expansive federal
68

Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 103 P.3d 1226, 1228-1229 (2005) (quoting
State v. Hahn, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)).
69
Id. (citing Holland, 181 F.3d at 603 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (internal
citations omitted))).
70
Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 727, 727 (2009).
71
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72
Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV.
967, 968 (2002).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Weiner, supra note 70, at 728 n.3 (citing Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 786 (1994) (noting that “[u]nlike modern preemption
doctrine, which is focused exclusively on the (express or implied) intent of Congress, the
earlier doctrine operated automatically whenever Congress entered a field of regulation; thus
any federal regulation of any given area automatically preempted all state regulation in the
same area.”)).
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authority.76 In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., an early field preemption
case, the Supreme Court stated that it should be assumed that “the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”77 Paramount to
the application of the preemption doctrine is the Justices’ “political or
philosophical beliefs about the scope of federal legislation and how it should
be interpreted.”78
Currently, preemption analysis involves state law yielding to federal
law, vis-a-vis the Supremacy Clause, “if the federal statute contains explicit
language preempting the state law.”79 Alternatively, “a court may find a state
law impliedly preempted if it directly conflicts with federal law—if
compliance with both state and federal law is a physical impossibility—or if
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment offederal goals,” i.e.,
“obstacle preemption.”80 When determining whether the preemption doctrine
applies, the Supreme Court has taken various routes. In some cases, the
Supreme Court has conspicuously ignored the presumption and in other cases
has reinforced the notion that in cases areas traditionally regulated by state
law,81 the presumption against preemption is given special force, while also
considering Congress’s purpose of passing the piece of legislation.82
76

Id. at 728.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
78
Davis, supra note 72, at 970. See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law,
Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) (“For most judges, whether liberal or conservative, these
cases pit one dimension of their ideology, their principles of federalism, against another,
their policy preferences or attitudes toward the particular local regulation at issue.”). See
also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 536 (2001).
79
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
695, 699-700 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
484 (1996) (“[T]he pre-emptive language of [the relevant statute] means we need not go
beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt at least
some state law …, [though] we must nonetheless ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted’
by that language ….” (citations omitted))).
80
Id. at 700.
81
“Traditional state powers” are those areas of governance pertaining to the “life, health,
and safety of the general public.” Davis, supra note 72, at 968.
82
Weiner, supra note 70, at 729.
77
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E. Similar Cases to Waldburger v. CTS Corp.
Prior to Waldburger, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits addressed the
issue of whether Section 9658 preempts state statutes of repose. In
McDonald v. Sun Oil Company, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar
issue as that in Waldburger. Plaintiff property owners in Jefferson County,
Oregon, brought suit against Sun Oil Company (“Sun”) for alleged
negligence, contribution, breach of contract and fraud due to the unlawful
dumping of calcine83 tailings at Horse Heaven Mine.84 Granting Sun’s
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the plaintiffs’
negligence claim was barred by Oregon’s statute of repose for negligent
injury to person or property.85 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
phrase “statute of limitations” in Section 9658 was intended by Congress to
include statutes of repose and it was ambiguous as to whether it excluded
statutes of repose.86 Like the court in Waldburger, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that many instances existed in which the terms “statute of
limitations” and “statute of repose” were used interchangeably by Congress.87
Thus, similar to the conclusion made in Waldburger, the court determined
there was considerable uncertainty about the distinction between the two
terms and so ambiguity existed as to whether Section 9658 applied solely to
statutes of limitation or included statute of repose.88
Because the term “statute of limitations” was ambiguous at the time
Congress passed Section 9658, the court next reviewed the legislative history
of CERCLA. Similarly to the court in Waldburger, the McDonald court
referenced the Group’s conclusions that Congress should “adopt a rule that
an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the

83

McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Calcine is a waste
product resulting from the processing of mercury ore into mercury. Mercury sulfide ore is
mined, crushed, and heated in a furnace or ‘retort’ to separate mercury from the ore. After
the heating process is complete, the crushed rock, now called calcine, is stockpiled.”).
84
Id. at 777.
85
Id. at 779.
86
Id.
87
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
88
Id.
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injury or disease and its cause.”89 Since the term “statute of repose” is not
used in any of the text of the United States Code, and because Congress
specifically cited to the Group’s recommendations, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the legislative history indicates that the term “statute of
limitations” applied to “statutes of repose.”90
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Poole Chemical
Company, holding that CERCLA did not preempt a Texas statute of repose
for products liability claims.91 The court contended that CERCLA was
intended only to address issues of delayed discovery regarding long-latency
diseases caused by the dumping of toxic chemicals.92 However, the products
liability claim derived from the rupturing of a tank containing agricultural
blending materials, which made the plaintiffs instantaneously aware of the
resulting harm.93 Because the injury that occurred was not associated with
long-latency diseases caused by hazardous materials, Section 9658 did not
apply.94
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Prior to analyzing the ruling of the district court, the Fourth Circuit in
Waldburger v. CTS Corp. examined the concepts of “statutes of limitation”
and “statutes of repose.”95 The court acknowledged that both concepts
function as limitations the amount of time a plaintiff could potentially bring a
claim.96 Thus, the court compared the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of
the two terms. A statute of limitation is a “law that bars claims after a
specified period…based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the
injury occurred or was discovered).”97 A statute of repose “bars any suit that
89
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is brought after a specified time since the defendant’s act…even if this period
ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.”98 The court noted
that because North Carolina barred lawsuits brought more than ten years after
the defendant acted regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge of his harm,99 the
limitation should be characterized as a statute of repose, rather than a statute
of limitation.100 Accordingly, the court concurred with the district court’s
assessment that despite North Carolina not explicitly identifying the
limitation as a statute of repose within the text of the law, it was proper to
categorize the law as such.101
After establishing that North Carolina’s ten-year limitation was a
statute of repose, the court embarked on an exercise of statutory
interpretation to determine whether Section 9658 of CERCLA would affect
the operation of the limitation.102 The court had to determine Congress’s
intent in passing Section 9658 by first examining the text of the statute to
determine whether the language was plain in meaning or ambiguous. 103 In
the analysis of whether the text was plain, the court took into consideration
the language itself, the specific context of the language, and the broader
context of the statute in its entirety.104
Upon considering these factors, the court determined that the statute
was ambiguous.105 Although on its face, the text could lead to a reasonable
conclusion that Section 9658 only applied to statutes of limitation since the
term is used five different times,106 compared to the term “statutes of repose”
98

Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)).
Id. at 441 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (2010)).
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Id. at 441-42 (internal citations omitted).
102
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Id. (citing United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1993))).
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Id.
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In his dissent, Circuit Judge Thacker cited the plain meaning of the language used in
§ 9658. He noted that the statute defines “the applicable limitations period” as the “period
specified in a statute of limitations (emphasis in orginal) during which a civil action … of
this section may be brought.” Id. at 446 (Thacker, J., dissenting). Thus, he concluded, §
9658 only preempts “state law where a state statute of limitation begins to run before it
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not being used at all, the court concluded that an alternate interpretation was
also feasible.107 In support of a second reading, the court compared the
language of Section 9658 to the North Carolina law.108 Under Section 9658,
two conditions regarding a state limitations period must be met before the
federally required commencement date applies to the cause of action: (1) it
must be an “applicable limitation period . . . specified in the State statute of
limitations or under common law,” and (2) it must “provide a commencement
date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date.”109
Applying these two conditions, the court outlined three reasons why
the North Carolina ten-year limitations met the requirements of Section 9658,
and was therefore preempted.110 First, the court reasoned that the ten-year
bar was a limitations period “specified in the State statute of limitations or
under common law.”111 Next, because the landowners had a ten-year
window to bring a civil action under the North Carolina law, the court
characterized the limitation as comporting with the definition of “applicable
limitations period” defined in Section 9658.112 Lastly, because the running of
the statute of limitations began when the defendant committed his last act, as
opposed to when the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm, the North Carolina
commencement date started earlier than its federal counterpart.113 Thus,
despite Section 9658’s repeated usage of “statute of limitations” in the text,
the law is susceptible to an interpretation that includes statutes of repose, like
North Carolina’s.114 Because of the possibility of two reasonable
interpretations, the court found the statutory language to be ambiguous.115

would have run under the federally required commencement date.” Id. at 446-47 (Thacker,
J., dissenting).
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Id. at 442.
108
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)).
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Id.
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Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52; quoting 42. U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)).
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Id. “The term ‘applicable limitations period’ means the period specified in a statute of
limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be
brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2).
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Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)).
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Id.
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Id. at 442-43.
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In support of their ruling, the court outlined two explanations for their
decision.116 First, the court reasoned that both courts and scholars have used
the terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” interchangeably.117
Thus, the court found that Congress’s sole usage of “statutes of limitation”
within the text was not dispositive as to whether Section 9658 should apply
to statutes of repose and it was entirely reasonable that Congress intended
“statute of limitations” to apply to ten-year limitations like the one found in
North Carolina.118 Further, the court held that Section 9658 lacked internal
consistency in reference to the “applicable limitations period” and
“commencement date” because the section failed to manifest a plain meaning
applicable to a statute of limitation found under the common law. Instead,
the section only discusses the applicability of the “applicable limitations
period” and “commencement date” under state statute.119
Because the court found the text of Section 9658 to be ambiguous,
they examined the congressional intent in passing the section and the
legislative history of CERCLA for interpretation purposes. 120 The court
noted that Section 9658 was adopted by Congress in response to the Group,
created at the time of the passing of CERCLA, which had the goal of
determining the “adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in
providing legal redress for harm…caused by the release of hazardous
substances into the environment.”121 Based on the Group’s findings and
recommendation to require all states to adopt a rule in which an action
accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered the
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harm and its cause,122 Congress preemptively passed Section 9658 to directly
address the problems identified by the Group.123
Additionally, the court pointed to the remedial and corrective—as
opposed to regulatory—nature of CERCLA.124 Specifically, the court noted
the characterization of CERCLA being a “backward-looking statute”
designed to ensure adequate remedies for plaintiffs with claims regarding
hazardous waste sites and toxic spills.125 Thus, the court reasoned that
because of the remedial nature of CERCLA, the section was passed by
Congress to comport with the goal of preempting state limitation periods that
would otherwise limit plaintiffs’ ability to bring forth causes of actions when
harms are delayed.126
Because of the reinforced characterization of CERCLA as corrective
in nature the court employed a “standard of liberal construction” applicable
to remedial statutes.127 Applying such a standard, the court explicitly
rejected an interpretation of Section 9658 that excluded application to
provisions like North Carolina’s ten-year bar on accrual of real property
claims.128 Although the court conceded than an alternate interpretation is
perfectly reasonable, the court refused to apply such a narrow approach that
“thwarts Congress’s unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from
toxic wreckage.”129 The court further reasoned that such a limited approach
122

“Worth noting is that the Group did not confine its concerns simply to statutes of
limitation: ‘The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of statutes of repose
which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a]
plaintiff’s claim before he knows that he has one.’” Id. at 439 (citing 301(e) Study Group,
supra note 48, at 241).
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U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354).
124
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in interpreting the application of Section 9658 to statutes of repose would
effectively “allow states to obliterate legitimate causes of action before they
exist.”130 Thus, the court held that Section 9658 preempts North Carolina’s
ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property claims.131
In so holding, the court acknowledged that many underlying policy
reasons justify statutes of repose.132 However, in support of their holding, the
court noted that the goal of statutes of repose is not solely to protect
defendants, but also to ensure the efficient processing of cases.133
Accordingly, the court noted that protections still exist for potential
defendants in that the burden of proof continues to rest on the plaintiff, and,
as time passes, necessary evidence will disappear and intervening causes will
complicate the burden of proving causation.134 Additionally, the court made
the observation that in under North Carolina law, plaintiffs are still required
to bring claims within three years of discovery, which is in accordance with
CERCLA. In conclusion, the court stated that by holding that North
Carolina’s ten-year limitation on the accrual of actions is preempted by
Section 9658 of CERCLA, the court simply furthered Congress’s intent to
help remove recovery barriers that victims of toxic waste face in seeking to
hold accountable those responsible for the harm caused by the dumping of
such waste.135
Notably in his dissent, Judge Thacker argued that a presumption
against preemption should be applied when interpreting Section 9658.136
Such a reading would limit the reach of Section 9658 to only state statutes of
limitation, without extending it to state statutes of repose. 137 The dissent
asserted that, “Even federal laws containing a preemption clause, such as

130

Id.
Id..
132
Id.
133
Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)).
134
Id.
131

135

Id. at 445.
Id. at 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 445 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
136

244

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1
9658, do not automatically escape the presumption against preemption.”138
Further, the dissent reasoned that a state’s ability to create a substantive right,
such as a state tort law limiting liability, has long been held to be within the
realm of state regulation.139 Thus, when taking these considerations as
whole, the dissent concluded, a presumption against preemption should
apply.140
V. COMMENT
With the advent of federal agencies promulgating complex and
convoluted regulations, like those implementing CERCLA, the jurisprudence
regarding whether these rules preempt similar state laws has become equally
complex and convoluted.141 Past precedent.142 In some instances, courts
have developed a “clear statement” rule regarding the presumption against
preemption: the court will not interpret a statute as overriding a state law
unless Congress has clearly and unambiguously stated its intent to
preempt.143 Other courts have articulated the rule explicitly, holding that the
presumption should be that Congress did not intend to supersede state law.144
Conversely, some courts have ignored the rule of presumption against
preemption completely.145 As a consequence of these “helter-skelter”
applications, some courts have been accused of using the preemption doctrine
as a shield to issue result-oriented decisions.146 Thus, in order to avoid such
138
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charges, and for the sake of judicial economy, there is a need for uniformity
in employing the preemption doctrine. Specifically, consistency in applying
the preemption language of Section 9658 of CERCLA within the federal
courts is especially crucial, since the implications of the section have fostered
much debate.147
In its quest to create uniformity among the federal courts’ application
of the preemptive language of Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit considered
two cases regarding the discovery rule in relation to state statutes of repose.
In McDonald v. Sun,148 the Ninth Circuit held that the phrase “statute of
limitations” was ambiguous. Thus, in considering Congress’s intent in
passing CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that Section 9658 was
intended to encompass state statutes of repose as well.149 In Waldburger, the
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, thus taking a step
towards uniformity among federal courts in the application of Section 9658
to include state statutes of repose. Notably, the Fourth Circuit distinguished
both Waldburger and McDonald from Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical Co.,150 a Fifth Circuit case involving a similar
issue. The Fourth Circuit articulated in its ruling that the plaintiffs in
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. had “prior knowledge of their
claims prior to expiration of the state statute of repose…the case [did] not
involve the delayed discovery…which [Section] 9658 was intended to
address.”151 Thus, the Fourth Circuit adequately distinguished Waldburger
and McDonald from Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., which
in turn should guide federal courts faced with similar issues regarding the
preemptive scope of Section 9658.
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As noted earlier, generally there has been a presumption against
preemption in fields traditionally regulated by the state152 and the burden is
on the plaintiff to overcome this presumption.153 However, there has been
the assumption that “historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.”154 In order to articulate this requirement of a “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress,” the Fourth Circuit was correct in analyzing
Congress’s intent and the legislative history of Section 9658. By doing so,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the remedial nature of CERCLA
collectively and Section 9658’s purpose of eliminating state-imposed
procedural obstacles for plaintiffs. Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that the
use of “statute of limitations” in Section 9658 was intended to include state
statutes of repose incorporates Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose,”
which in turn leads to a preemption of any conflicting state statutes of repose.
In response to this analysis, that if Congress’s “clear and manifest
purpose” were to include state statutes of repose, then such language would
have been included in Section 9658. However, the Fourth Circuit correctly
established that “statute of limitations” was often used interchangeably with
“statutes of repose” due to their common restrictive nature. Additionally, the
“clear and manifest purpose” of Congress should not be by the plain language
of the law, but rather the overall intent of passing such legislation should be
the primary focus of the court. Preemption should not hinge on the “clear
and manifest language” of Congress; preemption should hinge on the
purpose of the law. Thus, the Fourth Circuit was correct in applying
Congress’s intent of eliminating state obstacles by passing Section 9658 in
ruling that “statutes of limitation” included “statutes of repose.”
Additionally, like prior decisions construing Section 9658155 and
determining Congress’s intent, the Fourth Circuit gave substantial weight to
152
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the Group’s report in order to determine Congress’s purpose in passing the
section.156 The Group’s findings of inadequacies in existing common law
and statutory remedies providing redress for harms caused by the release of
hazardous substances157 were the impetus of Congress’s prompt action in
developing and passing Section 9658.158 Because the court gave significant
consideration to the Study in interpreting the preemption language of the
section as applying to statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, the court
has further elevated the significance of the Group’s findings, which will
potentially impact future courts in their analysis of Section 9658. Although it
is well within the individual states’ province to pass statutes of limitation
regarding tort law claims and is derivative of the states’ historic police
powers, such sovereignty is preempted when Congress’s purpose to do so is
“clear and manifest.”159 Cognizant of Congress’s intent to eliminate potential
procedural barriers pursuant to the Group’s findings, the Fourth Circuit
appropriately gave significant weight to these combined factors in holding
that Section 9658 preempted North Carolina’s statute of repose.
As a result of Waldburger, potential plaintiffs with claims arising
from alleged unlawful hazardous waste dumping will no longer have the
obstacles imposed by state statutes of repose.160 Instead, state statutes of
repose that would cause increased obstacles for private citizens seeking relief
from unlawful dumping of hazardous substances will now be preempted by
Section 9658. Additionally, in reaffirming the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in
McDonald,161 the Fourth Circuit has established precedent for other federal
courts faced with similar issues. Notably, defendants will not be susceptible
to a wave of litigation due to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Waldburger.
Procedural limitations, such as North Carolina’s requirement that plaintiffs
156
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bring claims within three years of discovery,162 will continue to provide
defendants some protection from untimely litigation. Additionally, the
burden of proof will remain on the plaintiffs, and meeting that burden may
become increasingly difficult as time passes.163 Thus because such procedural
limitations are still in place, defendants will not be vulnerable to an “opening
of the floodgates” of litigation. Rather, as a result of Waldburger, plaintiffs
have one procedural barrier removed—unfair statutes of repose—but are still
faced with a battle in meeting their burden of proof and statutes of limitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 9658 to include statutes
of repose, despite the seemingly plain language of the law, correctly reflects
Congress’s intent in passing the section. Through its ruling, the Fourth
Circuit has alleviated a common and onerous procedural barrier for plaintiffs
alleging harm due to illegal dumping of hazardous substances—time. Often,
any opportunity for redress for potential plaintiffs is fleeting because
environmental harms frequently take time to manifest into tangible harm.
However, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Waldburger allowmore time for
potential plaintiffs bringing claims to become aware of their injury and
develop a complaint, thus eliminating onerous time constraints that state
statutes of repose impose. Additionally, by holding that Section 9658
preempted North Carolina’s statute of repose, the court established clarity for
plaintiffs and other courts alike in determining the true potency of the
preemptive language of the section. In reaffirming the preemptive power of
Section 9658, the Fourth Circuit has reinvigorated Congress’s intent in
making CERCLA a remedial statute by insuring that victims of toxic waste
will not be hindered by inconsistent and restrictive state procedural obstacles.
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